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ABSTRACT 
Medical providers, patients, and their families have always been able to enjoy the 
abundance of U.S. society. When medical resources exceed the demand for care, all 
necessary medical resources are used to improve the health or save the life of each 
individual. However, the health care system in the U.S. is severely under-prepared to care 
for hundreds to thousands of victims simultaneously from a mass casualty event (MCE). 
The influx of patients would severely overwhelm emergency rooms. Although global 
events indicate the U.S. must prepare, the medical community has historically been 
uncomfortable openly discussing standards of care during a mass casualty event because 
it is equated with the “rationing” of care. This thesis demonstrates through four case 
studies that critical mortality was reduced and a greater number of critically injured 
survived due to improved triage accuracy, rapid movement to definitive care, 
implementation of damage control procedures, and coordinated and collaborative 
regional preparedness. The medical community must appreciate that altering standards of 
care during a MCE does not reduce overall care rendered; rather care is strategically 
directed, so critical mortality is lowered. 
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"Whoever destroys a soul, it is considered as if he destroyed an entire world.  
And whoever saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire world."  
Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 4:1 (22a) 
 
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Current mass casualty capacity in the United States is insufficient to provide care 
to a surge of critically ill or injured patients. Despite the abundance in U.S. society, one 
could even argue that today’s U.S. health care system operates in a disaster mode on a 
regular basis. A routine day in the emergency departments is plagued with long waits, 
serious overcrowding, resource constrictions, and frequent ambulance diversions due to 
internal capacity being exhausted (Sasser et al., 2007, p. 1). Yet the philosophies and 
values of U.S. medicine are to provide health care services of unlimited means. 
The situation in U.S. emergency departments (EDs) has been quickly 
deteriorating. The number of ED visits from1996 to 2006 increased 32 percent from 90.3 
million to 119.2 million while, the number of ED decreased 5 percent from 4019 to 3833 
in the same 11-year period. Thus the population based rates increased from 34.2 to 40.5 / 
100 persons (Pitts, Niska, Xu, & Burt, 2008, p.2). Seventeen point four percent of the 
119.2 million visits in 2006 were accountable to the uninsured that do not have primary 
care providers and often seek routine health care in EDs (Pitts et al., 2008, p. 2). 
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The well-known adage in emergency management is that all disasters are local. 
No different is the case with health care. Health care following a disaster is local. During 
a disaster, terrorist event, or biological disease outbreak, the hospital component of the 
health care system bares the burden of the victims/patients (Kelen et. al., 2006, p.1984; 
Sasser et al., 2007, p. 1). The hospitals closest to the disaster epicenter receive the most 
patients, except when there is no clear epicenter. 
U.S. emergency rooms are sorely unprepared for daily operations, let alone to 
handle the surge of patients immediately following a disaster. U.S. physicians are not 
adequately trained to handle the injury types most common with explosions, the most 
pervasive of terrorist’s techniques. Federal systems such as the National Disaster Medical 
System (NDMS) can only provide assets several days after an event. Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is fraught with issues that can delay 
immediate care. Plans are written but not exercised, and federal agencies are creating 
solutions which may be more detrimental than beneficial.  
Most experts, health care administrators, and health care providers agree that 
during a mass casualty event, hospitals and health care systems will not be able to 
provide services in the manner in which they do on a routine basis. Peer-reviewed articles 
and professional presentations are beginning to address “altered” or “situational” 
standards of care as a way of dealing with shortages of personnel, equipment, supplies 
and time. Events such as Hurricane Katrina demonstrate it is most certainly imperative 
that the medical community start to tackle this ethically complex issue with rigor. 
However, it must be cautioned that the recommendations are not entombed simply in 
tactics. A comprehensive strategic assessment must be included so that the paradigm of 
mass trauma health care delivery will focus on reducing critical mortality rather than on 
how to best ration resources. The critical mortality rate is defined as the number, as a 
percentage, of all critically injured survivors who died (Frykberg, 2002, p. 204). The 
potential for enormous benefits that can be obtained in lives saved by changing the 
paradigm of health care delivery following a mass trauma casualty event from one 
focused on the individual to one that is population based needs to be examined.  
 3
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
• When does the current practice of “good medicine” become “bad 
medicine”? 
• If the current standard of care is not the best standard of care during a 
mass casualty event (MCE) then what is? 
• What can be learned by examining discrete MCEs and distinct health care 
delivery systems throughout the world? 
C. ARGUMENT: MAIN CLAIMS, WARRANTS, EVIDENCE AND 
CHALLENGES 
Advance planning for the delivery of health care during a MCE will mitigate 
crisis decision making at the time of an event. This will allow for the optimization of 
resources and reduced critical mortality rates. Improving outcomes will focus on the 
overall needs of the population rather than the individual. This course of action will do 
the most good for the greatest number and result in increased overall survival.   
Emergency mass casualty response is triggered when the resource demands 
outstrip the resources available. It is incremental in nature and depends on the situation at 
hand. Obviously this is a very complex process that requires judicious consideration and 
ethical review. The decision to deploy situational emergency mass casualty care can 
never be made lightly or in isolation as this is a deviation from the typical standard of 
care. For successful implementation, doctors and other critical care health care 
professionals must understand and be trained to triage within a MCE framework.  
There is a general feeling of reluctance by the medical community to discuss 
deviating from the typical standard of care although reports from Hurricane Katrina 
indicate that medical providers were forced to. Health professionals are very concerned 
about the liability involved in situational emergency mass casualty care. It is the role of 
professional societies to define the standards of care during a MCE. As such, it will 
normalize the practice in disaster situations. 
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D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
1. The Literature 
The literature review indicates that government agencies are realizing that 
disasters create more health and medical surge than current health care delivery has 
capacity. The research of this thesis will go a step further and examine how mass casualty 
health care is handled in numerous other settings. From this analysis, recommendations 
will be made to U.S. health and medical community from the best practices of other 
systems. 
2. Future Research Efforts 
The topic of situational standards of care is only coming to the forefront of the 
literature in the U.S. health and medical community. Implementation of situational 
standards of care is limited at the local level.  Few health care systems or regional health 
authorities have developed standards of care to be activated during a MCE.  This research 
takes the next logical step and looks at what has been working throughout the world. 
Continued research is necessary both in this specific part of the problem and with the 
acceptance of the community that is served. 
3. Immediate Consumer (Identify)  
The audiences of this thesis are health and medical providers and health system 
administrators along the entire continuum of the U.S. health care delivery—from pre-
hospital through to the emergency room and on to definitive care. Additionally, this 
thesis is being written for consideration by health care professional societies to aide them 
in developing standards of care during a MCE that will provide guidance to their 
members and establish professional criteria to protect providers who might find 
themselves in this less than desirable predicament.  
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4. HS Practitioners and Leaders Nationally 
Public health and medical issues are just emerging as disciplines within the 
homeland security community. Given that homeland security is made up of professionals 
from a myriad of disciplines it is imperative that each profession share its research and 
expertise in such a way as to make it understandable within the homeland security 
community. This thesis will outline the crisis in the current health care system and 
demonstrate how fragile the system is. When taxed by a terrorist event or national 
disaster, it will be unable to surge to accommodate the additional load. Since health care 
is something that all Americans expect to be available when needed, this research should 
prove to be eye-opening to all members of the homeland security and motivate on-going 
research and investigation into improving our health delivery system. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this research will be a policy options analysis examining the 
trauma health care systems of Spain, the United Kingdom, Israel, and the U.S. military. 
In particular, how each of these systems handles mass casualty events will be explored 
and analyzed in relation to critical mortality rates. The analysis will be fused so tangible 
recommendations can be made to the U.S. health and medical communities on how best 
to adopt and implement incremental situational standards of care for mass trauma care in 
the U.S.  
The systems that are being selected have met several criteria. Countries selected 
are westernized. The government structure is more similar to the U.S. than countries in 
other parts of the world. The values and expectations of the general population are 
assumed to be somewhat similar. Medical training and practice among health care 
providers is also being assumed to be somewhat similar. 
Each of these systems has had either one major representative event or as in the 




casualty care. Four systems are examined to give a broad scope of data to be analyzed 
and to represent the continuum of mass casualty scenarios that are faced by health 
colleagues throughout the world. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Explosions are the most common cause of casualties associated with terrorism 
(Arnold, Tsai, Halpern, Smithline, Stok, & Ersoy, 2003, p.221). As terrorists have 
become more sophisticated, extensive coordination allows numerous cities to be targeted 
simultaneously. With numerous cities involved, the effect is dramatically augmented. 
Depending on the characteristics of the bombing, the local emergency medical resources 
can be easily overwhelmed. Health care officials across this country are anticipating 
profound shortcomings in the current health care system in caring for the surge of victims 
following a disaster (Sasser et al., 2007, p. 1; Kelen et. al., 2006, p. 1984). This literature 
review examines the body of literature that deals with health care delivery in the United 
States following a mass casualty event, particularly a bombing. 
Terrorist bombings are a “predictable surprise” (Sasser et al., 2007, p. 5). 
Bombings are far more pervasive in the U.S. than is generally realized, and the literature 
indicates that hospitals are not prepared to handle them (United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Majority Staff, 2008). 
According to the FBI between 1988 and 1997, there were 17,579 bombings in the United 
States, an average of 5 per day (Davis & Lee, 2004). Explosives remain an inexpensive 
way for terrorist to disrupt society while advancing their cause. As terrorists have become 
more sophisticated, extensive coordination allows numerous cities or sites to be targeted 
simultaneously, as was the case on September 11, 2001.  
A. DEFINITION OF MASS CASUALTY CARE 
A Mass Casualty Event (MCE) is not defined by a set size but rather as any event 
that exceeds the resources of the health system or network for an extended period of time. 
In a small community, an event with ten casualties may exceed the capacity of the local 
system and be considered a MCE. Yet that same event in a large major center, assuming 
resources were not over-burdened, would not be considered a MCE. The principles of 
health care delivery during a MCE shift focus to the treatment of the population as a 
whole rather than the individual. 
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During a disaster, the hospital component of the health care system cares for the 
burden of the victims/patients (Kelen et al., 2006, p. 1984). The hospital closest to the 
disaster epicenter will receive the most patients except when there is no clear epicenter 
such as a wide-spread bioterrorism event or pandemic infectious disease. In the first 24 
hours after the September 11 plane crashes in New York City, over 500 victims presented 
for emergency care at a hospital four blocks from ground zero, while another 300 sought 
care at the next hospital which was within one mile (Pesola, Dujar, & Wilson, 2002, pp. 
220-2). On March 11, 2004, ten nearly simultaneous bombings occurred in Madrid 
killing 177 people and injuring nearly 2000, of which 272 patients sought care within the 
first 2.5 hours at the closest hospital (Peral-Gutierrez de Ceballos et al., 2005, p. 104). 
The Hippocratic Oath delineates societal values in the ethical practice of 
medicine. In it, physicians promise to keep the good of the patient as the highest value. 
Health care in the U.S. is delivered with the highest standards. U.S. medical practitioners 
are trained to that level and patients and their families demand it. Each individual patient 
receives all the resources necessary. However, during a mass casualty event that involved 
hundreds to thousands or even tens of thousands of people; the demands placed on the 
local public health and medical system can easily be overwhelmed for a varying length of 
time depending on the circumstances of the situation. Medical providers, patients, and 
their families have always been able to enjoy the abundance of U.S. society. Medicine 
has always had the luxury to make life or life decisions. Rarely has the health care 
delivery system been placed in situations where decisions had to be made that were life 
and death situations—where medical providers were forced to work outside the standards 
of which they were trained and comfortable.   
B. DEFINITION OF SITUATIONAL STANDARDS OF CARE  
Standards within medical care define the type of care that is given, to whom, by 
whom, where, and when (Health Systems Research, Inc. [HSR], 2005, pp. 7-8). 
Standards define the clinical intervention based on current medical practice and 
established clinical guidelines. These guidelines are structured based on peer-reviewed 
research and evidence based outcomes. Standards define who should receive health care 
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based on their condition and likelihood of response to the treatment. They also determine 
which professional type has the ability to provide the care based on their certification 
and/or licensure, their scope of practice, and the law. Standards also define the location of 
where care can occur and delineate who has authority.  Under normal conditions, when 
medical resources exceed the demand for care, it is assumed that all necessary medical 
resource would be used to improve the health or save the life of each individual. 
Situational Standards of Care is a broad sweeping term that can refer to many 
different components within a health care system. The phrase has generally been defined 
as a shift in providing care and allocating scarce resources, supplies or personnel that 
saves as many lives as possible, rather than focusing on saving the individual. Examples 
of Situational Standards of Care may include pre-hospital operations or using alternative 
sites such as schools, houses of worship, or hotels for care rather than a hospital. It may 
mean expanding the scope of practice for certain professional types. For instance, nurses 
may provide services usually only provided by physicians. Or it could mean legislation is 
in place so that providers from another state are able to provide services contingent on an 
executive order from the governor. Infection control standards could be modified so 
rather than individual isolation; groups with similar exposure can be isolated together. In 
the appropriate situation it could mean that the trauma field triage criteria are put into 
place. These are only brief examples of some of the components of Situational Standards 
of Care discussed in the U.S. literature. Situational Standards of Care is a very 
complicated equation with numerous variables that can all be adjusted in order to 
preserve as many lives as possible.  
C. RECENTLY PUBLISHED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES 
Numerous articles have been written in the United States dealing with medical 
capacity during disaster. Terminology used in the literature has included altered 
standards of care, surge capacity, field triage criteria, population based health care, 
rationing and mass casualty preparedness. For the purposes of this literature review, all 
terms will be used interchangeably, although it is important to note that some terms are 
perceived to be more acceptable than others. Several of the major works were written 
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recently by agencies within the U.S. government, indicating that there is a gap in the 
health care this country is able to provide and the level of disaster and destruction that has 
been demonstrated recently in Madrid, Spain; New York City; and London, England.  
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published In a Moment’s 
Notice: Surge Capacity for Terrorist Bombings in April 2007. The Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) published Altered Standards of Care in Mass Casualty 
Events in April 2005. Likewise, numerous state standards and guidelines exist within the 
literature. 
The term Altered Standards of Care was the phrase used in the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) publication Altered Standards of Care in Mass 
Casualty Events. Altered Standards of Care and is a broad sweeping term that can refer to 
many different components within a health care system. The phrase has generally been 
defined as a shift in providing care and allocating scarce resources, supplies or personnel 
that saves as many lives as possible, rather than focusing on saving the individual.  
Altered Standards of Care is a very complicated equation with numerous variables 
that can all be adjusted in order to preserve as many lives as possible. The literature 
indicates that countries that deal with mass casualties more frequently have plans that are 
integrated in to their daily operations. Much can be learned from these health systems and 
can be incorporated into the daily operations in the United States. Unfortunately, no 
literature was identified that detailed the exercising or deployment of Altered Standards 
of Care in the health care system during a true or simulated disaster.  
In April 2005, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services conducted a 
study to examine the use of Altered Standards of Care in mass casualty events. The study 
included identifying what planners need to know and key guiding principles necessary to 
develop effective health and medical response plans (HSR, 2005, pp. 1-2). Numerous key 
findings were identified. These included: 
• The goal of Altered Standards of Care is to maximize the number of lives 
saved. Rather than do everything possible to save one life, it is necessary 
to allocate scarce resources to save as many lives as possible.  
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• Health systems do not have adequate guidance or plans to implement 
Altered Standards of Care when needed during a mass casualty event.  
• The allocation of resources must be judge to be fair and flexible so it can 
be adjusted to the size and scope of the event accordingly.  
• The plan needs to address all types of disasters (bombings, bioterrorism, 
etc). 
• Qualified mass casualty providers are necessary for the appropriate 
implementation of Altered Standards of Care.  
• To ensure effective response, consideration must be given to non-medical 
issues such as who has the authority to activate, legal liabilities, 
reimbursement issues, and public relations (HSR, 2005, pp 2-3). 
The Department of Health and Human Services drafted guidance for health 
systems to consider when developing their Altered Standards of Care Plans. The 
recommended actions from this documented included: 
• Develop general and event-specific plans for the allocation of scare 
medical resources during a mass casualty event. 
• Implement processes to address non-medical issues that impact health care 
delivery including finances, public relations, and risk communication. 
• Identify local, state and federal law that affect the delivery of health care 
and consider appropriate modifications. 
• Develop and utilize searchable databases to verify credentials of health 
providers who arrive on-site as volunteers. 
• Ensure coordinated health and medical leadership for the response, 
utilizing Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS). 
• Continually train all staff (both medical and non-medical) to effectively 
respond in a mass casualty event. 
• Develop a planning guide to assist preparedness planners’ efforts. 
Planning must occur both within the individual health system as well as 
throughout the greater region to ensure adequate coordination (HSR, 2005, 
pp 3–4). 
Both the CDC and AHQR publications demonstrate an acknowledgement that the 
health care system in this country is severely under prepared to handle disasters. On 
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routine days, emergency departments are overcrowded and resources constrained (Sasser 
et al., 2007, p. 1). The literature was in agreement that emergency room capacity in the 
United States is diminished and would be severely overwhelmed with the influx of 
patients from a disaster. 
The literature indicates numerous triage systems currently being used across 
United States’ emergency rooms, including Smart Triage and Rapid Transport (START), 
JumpSTART (a pediatric modification to START), Pre-Hospital Trauma Life Support 
(PHTLS), and Advance Trauma Life Support (ATLS) (Davis & Lee, 2004). These 
systems are predicated on resources and facilities being fully available to the patient 
(HSR, 2005, p.5). Additionally, the literature did not recommend one specific 
methodology for disaster field triage that is agreed upon (HSR, 2005, p. 11).   
The triage system being used by the military is Tactical Combat Casualty Care 
(TC3) for injured soldiers (Davis & Lee, 2004). The U.S. military has adopted new 
strategies which have resulted in improved outcomes. Death rates after wounding have 
been reduced significantly from 42 percent at the time of the Revolutionary War to less 
than 10 percent in the current conflict in Iraq. Of course, many factors can be 
contributing to this improved outcome. Even between the first Gulf War to the current 
conflict the death rate has been decreased from 24 percent to less than 10 percent 
(Gawande, 2004, p. 2472).  
No article was identified that described the recommendations from the CDC or 
AHQR publications occurring in U.S. emergency rooms. The CDC determined that 75 
percent of hospitals have disaster plans that had a bombing response component yet only 
20 percent had ever exercised the plan (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control 
(Sasser et al., 2007, p. 7). It is additionally documented that many of the civilian staff are 
not adequately trained to provide emergency care for certain types of disaster injuries. 
Civilian emergency physicians routinely care for injuries such as blunt and penetrating 
trauma. They have much less experience dealing with crush and blast injuries or total 
body disruption injuries consistent with bombings. Until physicians and providers have 
the on-going training they need, they will not be prepared to handle the surge of patients 
with injuries outside their normal patient profile. In a survey published in 2004 in the 
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Journal of Trauma, 27 percent of trauma surgeons reported that they were not prepared to 
manage blast injuries, a most common multi-system life-threatening injury associated 
with bombings (Ciralo et al., 2004, p. 1037). 
A weakness noted in the CDC report was that the panel of experts was composed 
predominately of physicians, which influenced the content of the writing. Topics such as 
“drugs and pharmaceutical supplies” and “nursing care” were distilled to a tactical to-do 
list and not given the full consideration that would be required to develop a 
comprehensive plan. This demonstrates the complexity of this issue and the need for all 
disciplines to be involved in the planning. Of additional note, none of the literature 
identified for this review written by American authors or government agencies drew from 
lessons learned in other countries. 
D. RECENTLY PUBLISHED CHEST STUDIES 
In May of 2008, several supplements were published following the Task Force for 
Mass Critical Care Summit that occurred January, June, and December 2007. The 
supplements were written by a multidisciplinary panel of 37 critical care experts spanning 
numerous fields. They examined current critical care preparedness and response 
capabilities so as to suggest a framework for surge capacity in a mass casualty critical 
care environment. The task force understood that although MCEs frequently occur 
throughout the world, the medical community in the U.S. has limited experience 
providing care during a MCE.  Four unique yet related documents yielded from the task 
force’s work. These included: 
• Current Capabilities and Limitations; 
• A Framework for Optimizing Critical Care; 
• Medical Resources for Surge Capacity; 
• A Framework for Allocation of Scarce Resources in Mass Critical Care. 
When the suggestions came forth from the task force, they made quite a stir in the 
medical community. Words such as limitations, rationing, withholding, and withdrawing 
were used in the recommendations which roused heated discourse. Recommendations 
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started out innocuously enough—every hospital with an intensive care unit (ICU) should 
plan in a regional and coordinated fashion. The recommendations continued:  
• ICUs need to be prepared to handle triple their usual bed count; 
• Hospitals must plan to deliver care for 10 days without external assistance; 
• Every community must develop a graded/ situational response plan. 
In the forth supplement, the recommendations examined the triage process 
advising that triage be a uniform approach. Triage decisions must rely on set objective 
and quantitative criteria as further delineated: 
• Rationing of critical care will only occur after augmentation has been 
exhausted; 
• Limitations will be commensurate with the true lack in resources; 
• Restraints of critical care will occur uniformly; 
• Equal emphasis should be given to withholding, as well as ,withdrawing 
care; 
• Patients not meeting the criteria to receive critical care will receive 
palliative care. 
The report defined inclusions and exclusion criteria to receive critical care. 
Exclusion criteria, in addition to little likelihood of survival, included sequential organ 
failure assessment scores (SOFA) and concomitant pre-existing chronic diseases. SOFA 
is a score that measure organ failure. Patients with SOFA scores that represented greater 
than or equal to 80 percent mortality were recommended for the exclusion category. 
Concomitant chronic diseases identified as exclusion criteria included metastatic 
malignant disease (cancers); end-stage organ failure of the heart, lung, or liver; 
unwitnessed cardiac arrest; and most controversial, age greater than 85 years (Devereaux 
et al., 2008, p. 60S). 
The articles the published by the American College of Chest Physicians in the 
journal CHEST are not only revolutionary; they are also quite controversial among the 
medical communities. They were the first articles to be written by a panel of experts who 
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wrote so succinctly about the need for the medical community to agree to and adopt a set 
objective and quantitative criteria for triaging the victims of a mass casualty event when 
resources are constrained. 
E. CENTRAL TENET(S) OF EXISTING U.S. DATA  
Examination of the literature indicates that improved outcomes occur during a 
mass casualty event with improved triage accuracy. Effective triage accuracy is defined 
in the literature as identifying the critically injured in an accurate and timely matter and 
sorting them based on their criticality. Triage accuracy is then further driven by decreased 
over-triage rates and under-triage rates. 
Over-triage is defined as the assignment of non-critically injured victims to 
immediate care even when the victim’s injuries do not categorize them as critical. 
Excessive over-triage pulls limited resources from the truly critically injured to the 
population that has been over-triaged, spreading resources over an even greater number 
of people. Conversely, under-triage occurs when victims who are critically injured are not 
identified as such and are not assigned to immediate care. 
A linear relationship between over triage rates and critical mortality rates has been 
demonstrated in the literature. This linear relationship was demonstrated in a 
retrospective analysis conducted by Eric Frykberg (see Figure 1). In events where the 
over-triage rate was low, the critical mortality was low. In events where the over-triage 
rates were high, the critical mortality rates were higher. Specifically, the 1983 Beirut 
Airport (BE) terrorist bombing had a very high over-triage rate of 80 percent and an 
elevated critical mortality rate of 37 percent. Likewise, the event labeled as CC in Figure 
1 is the 1969 ground attack on the Chu Chi base camp during the Vietnam War. The 
over-triage rate was 75 percent with an elevated critical mortality rate of 33 percent. 
At the other end of the linear relation, the 1974 Guildford pub (GP) bombing had 
a very low over-triage rate of 8.3 percent with a zero percent critical mortality rate. The 
Craigavon Area (CA) Hospital from 1972 to 1980 had an overall over triage of 20 
percent and a critical mortality rate of only four percent The Oklahoma City (OC) 
bombing of 1995 had a relatively low over-triage rate of 31 percent and a low critical 
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mortality rate of nine percent TL represents the 1974 London Tower bombing with an 
over-triage rate of 47 percent and a critical mortality rate of 10 percent (Frykberg, 2002, 
p. 207). 
 
Figure 1.   Over-triage Rate to Critical Mortality Rate, in 10 Terrorist Bombing Incidents 
from 1969 to 1995 (From Frykberg, 2002, p. 207) 
Upon further examination of the literature, the theory that there is a linear 
relationship between over-triage rates and critical mortality rates is further validated in a 
retrospective review of mass-causality events in Israel from October 1, 2000 to 
September 1, 2004. During this period, 93 mass-casualty events occurred in Israel, of 
which 33 occurred in the city of Jerusalem. The study looked specifically at the events 
that occurred in Jerusalem and were handled by Hadassah Hebrew University Medical 
Center, the sole Level 1 Trauma Center in Jerusalem and a hospital that is unfortunately 
highly experienced at providing trauma care to victims of terrorism. The study reviewed 
541 victims who presented to the emergency department of which 208 were admitted. 
Overall mortality was measured to be 8.5 percent (Aschkenasy-Steuer et al., 2005, p. 
491). The remarkable low mortality rate is credited to several dynamic factors which 
increase triage accuracy which include the forward deployment of surgeons and 
anesthesiologists, immediate establishment of command and control, unidirectional 
victim flow, and “scoop and run.” These factors will be further examined in Chapter V.    
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Triage accuracy is improved with the reduction of over-triage. Yet the literature 
cautioned not to reduce over-triage rates so greatly that under-triaging inadvertently 
occurs. Under-triage is very life-threatening situation for the victim who was not 
accurately triaged. Under-triage rates are rarely reported in the literature, but research by 
Frykberg and Tepas indicates that an over-triage rate of at least 50 percent is necessary to 
reduce the potential critical mortality that possibly could occur when under-triage occurs 
(Frykberg & Tepas, 1988, p. 569). Although it is advisable to reduce over-triage rates, it 
important not to reduce it so greatly that the critically injured are not properly identified. 
Over-triage rates and under-triage rates are not able to be determined until a 
retrospective analysis of the trauma care given is conducted. Criticality is determined 
using the Injury Severity Score (ISS). ISS is an anatomical scoring system that provides 
an overall numerical score for a victim with multiple injuries. ISSs range in value from 0-
75. The ISS has a linear corollary relationship with mortality and morbidity and severity 
of injuries. A noted weakness of the ISS is that different body regions are not weighted 
differently. Thus different injury patterns can generate similar scores (Baker, O’Neill, 
Haddon, & Long, 1974, pp. 187-196). However, all scoring systems have their 
advantages and disadvantages. ISS is an established and well regarded tool in the medical 
community to assign criticality to victims with multiple injuries. 
It is critical to remember not all disasters are the same. Caring for victims from a 
bombing that is immediate and destructive differs greatly from a caring for those affected 
by a biological event which is evolving and geographically widespread. Much of the 
literature reviewed looked specifically at mass casualty preparedness in relation to 
particular disaster type. This is helpful for targeting research specific to bombings. Some 
of the research was a bit too specific, such as looking specifically at ventilator rationing. 
Research that is too specific does not contribute significantly to the overarching changes 
that need to be addressed in the paradigm of U.S. health care delivery during a disaster.  
F. GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
Further examination of the literature needs to be completed to understand what 
other countries who deal with bombings more frequently have put into place. In one 
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article, researcher Shimon Glick “defined ethical principles” valued by the U.S., Great 
Britain, Israel and Sweden (Glick, 2001, pp. 118-119). Israel and Sweden have listed 
mutual assistance and solidarity as values while the U.S. has listed choice. Table 1 
delineates the values that shape health care delivery. Understanding these differences is 
imperative to know if what other countries are doing can be modified to be acceptable to 
the U.S. population that values choice as highly as it does. 
Table 1.   Values that Shape Health Care Delivery  
United States Great Britain Israel Sweden 
Security Fairness Justice Human Dignity 
Savings Efficiency Mutual Assistance Solidarity 
Simplicity Effectiveness Equality Efficiency 
Responsibility Responsiveness   
Choice Integration   
Quality Accountability   
G. AREAS THAT REMAIN UNKNOWN OR UNEXPLORED 
The medical community, as well as health care leadership, has historically been 
very uncomfortable discussing situational standards of care openly because it is believed 
that the public equates situational standards of care with the “rationing” of care. It is 
feared that there will be loss in public confidence in a particular hospital, health system, 
or government agency. As such Situational Standards of Care plans have not been 
broadly implemented in local hospitals. Health care staff is not trained to the specific 
variables that can be altered, nor are they trained to understand the epidemiological 
differences among mass casualty events.  
The 2008 publication of the CHEST articles following the Task Force for Mass 
Critical Care Summit spawned much heated discussion within the medical community, 
particularly with recommendations that fly directly in the face of the Hippocratic Oath 
such as the withdrawal of care or an age of 85 years or greater excluding a victim from 
receiving care. The CHEST studies stimulated much needed discussion in the community 
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and further research needs to be conducted to capture the medical community’s 
perceptions about the delivery of trauma care during a mass casualty event when the 
resources are limited.  
The previous reluctance to openly discuss situational standards of care has 
stymied necessary and life-saving planning efforts. Situational standards of care are only 
beginning to be addressed in the literature. Without proper addressing, medical providers 
are put into situations where they are not prepared nor are they protected legally.  The 
decisions are made in the heat of the moment, as they were at the Superdome after 
Hurricane Katrina with the evacuation of New Orleans residents. This piece-meal 
approach does not allow for a comprehensive, systematic approach that considers all 
variables in concert, resulting in the most lives saved. Continuing research needs to be 
conducted to validate if in fact, situational standards of care are a contributing factor to 
reducing critical mortality rates and thus in preserving life, rather than a “rationing” of 
care.   
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III. SPAIN 
A. SPAIN’S HISTORY AND EVOLUTION 
Spain is a nation of 40.5 million people (as of July 2007) that spends 6.3 percent 
of its Gross National Product (GNP) on health care (Blendon, Donelan, Jovell, Pellise, & 
Lombrardia, 1991, p. 216). The life expectancy is slightly higher than the U.S. and its 
infant mortality rate is slightly lower than the U.S. Through the years, the health care 
system of the country has developed through five distinct periods into what it currently is 
today. 
• Post war 1939-1966 
• Expansion 1967-1975 
• Democratization 1976-1981 
• First Socialist Gov 1982-1986 
• Health Care Reform Initiative Since 1987 
Following the Spanish Civil War in 1939, Spain created its first social security 
system that required mandatory worker contribution. From its inception in 1939 until 
1975, 85 percent of the population was covered by this plan (Blendon et al., 1991, p. 
217). Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, the government focused on building a 
strong centralized health care system in urban centers.  
With the end of the Franco era in 1975, Spain entered into the democratization 
period. With that, the Spanish Constitution was accepted in 1978. It provided the right to 
health protection and health care. With the return of democracy in 1978, the social 
security system was restructured and renamed the National Institute of Public Health 
Care (INSALUD). INSALUD remained highly centralized and structured health care 
system but was unable to meet the regional needs of the local populations. This led to 
further legislation in the 1986—The General Health Act. 
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The main principles within the General Health Act were to provide public 
funding, with universal, free health services at the time of use and the devolution of 
health affairs to autonomous regional communities. The General Health Act was also 
designed to allow for the inclusion of different public health structures and services under 
the National Health System through the creation of the Inter-Territorial Board. The Inter-
Territorial Board which is presided over by the Health Minister allows for coordination to 
occur while still allowing for decentralization of health care. Administratively Spain is 
organized through 50 provinces, 17 autonomous communities and two autonomous cities, 
all of which are part of the National Health System Inter-Territorial Board. Today, health 
care in Spain is a non-contributory benefit paid through taxation. The services provided 
include health promotion, preventive care, diagnostic and therapeutic techniques, health 
maintenance and rehabilitation. 
B. REPRESENTATIVE EVENT 
On March 11, 2004, the day prior to a major election in Spain, four near 
simultaneous attacks were perpetrated on the commuter trains during the morning rush 
hour in Madrid; 177 were killed instantaneously and an additional 2062 were injured 
(Peral-Gutierrez de Ceballos et al., 2005, p. 105). Official reports state that more that 15 
public hospitals cared for the 966 people who required care (Peral-Gutierrez de Ceballos 
et al., 2005, p. 105). In less than three hours, a surge of 272 patients arrived at the 
Gregorio Maranon University General Hospital (GMUGH) in Madrid, with a total of 212 
seeking care from the event (Peral-Gutierrez de Ceballos et al., 2005, p. 105). Of those 
transported to hospitals to receive care, 14 died subsequently, raising the death toll to 191 
(Peral-Gutierrez de Ceballos et al., 2005, p. 105). The critical mortality rate, defined as 
the death rate among the critical survivors, was 17.2 percent (5/29) (Peral-Gutierrez de 
Ceballos et al., 2005, p. 105). Critical mortality rate is universally accepted metric to 
measure the magnitude of a disaster and the outcomes of the medical management of the 
critically injured.  
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C. IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESSES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
One success noted in the after action review reports was that there were “an 
abundance of medical teams, nursing staff and resources to treat the critically injured and 
no critically injured patient experienced a delay in treatment.” It was reported that over 
70,000 health professionals rendered care and an astounding 291 ambulances were 
available to transport victims (Peral-Gutierrez de Ceballos et al., 2005, p. 105). Triage 
accuracy was cited as an area that needed improvement. As typical during a large scale 
disaster, “over-triaging” or the inappropriate assignment of non-critically injured victims 
to the category of critical was determined to be 68 percent (Frykberg, 2005, p. 20). The 
concern when over-triaging occurs is that limited medical resources will become further 
overwhelmed with victims who are not the most in need of the resources. However, the 
critical mortality rate of 17.2 percent appears to be within the expected range and did not 
appear to be negatively influenced by the high over-triage rate. Important to note was the 
under-triage rate was determined to be zero indicting that no critically injured victim was 
over-looked (Peral-Gutierrez de Ceballos et al., 2005, p. 106). This most likely positively 
influenced the critical mortality rate. 
Triage at GMUGH was performed by the most experienced trauma specialists at 
the entrance of the Emergency Department. Casualty distribution appears to have been 
handled well. The closest hospital, the Gregorio Maranon University General Hospital, 
was not overwhelmed with the victims they received. Distribution of victims to the most 
appropriate surroundings hospitals allowed GMUGH to serve as an initial casualty 
collection site and maintain capacity for future incoming victims. Post-event commentary 
cited other important lessons that contributed to the low critical mortality rate including 
the utilization of damage control procedures. 
D. GENERALIZABLE PRACTICES 
Elected officials in U.S. wanted to examine what lessons could be learned from 
the events in Spain. On March 25, 2008, a study was conducted at the request of 
Representative Henry Waxman in seven key U.S. cities to determine whether any of 
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these cities could handle a surge of patients like that which was handled in Madrid, Spain 
on March 11. Cities that were included were New York City, Los Angeles, Washington 
D.C., Chicago, Houston, Denver and Minneapolis. It was determined that none of these 
seven cities would have been able to handle the surge of patients as was handled by the 
one single hospital in Madrid (GMUGH), which was able to handle 272 patients in less 
than three hours (House Committee, 2008). The hospitals cited three new Medicaid rules 
that will have an impact in their ability to respond to mass casualty incidents. The 
hospitals estimated an annual loss of $623–$654 million from these changes in the 
regulations (see Table 2) (House Committee, 2008). These changes to Medicaid 
combined with the increased population ED visits, which, as previously have noted, 
between 1996 and 2006 grew from 34.2 to 40.5 per 100 persons, will continue to 
overwhelm and further debilitate the fragile U.S. emergency medical system (Pitts et al., 
2008, p. 2). The Medicaid changes include: 
• The Cost Limit for Public Providers Rule (CMS 2258-FC, 29 FR 29748) 
which narrows the definition of a public provider and limits payments to 
public providers to the cost of treating Medicaid patients. 
• The Payments for Graduate Medical Education (GME) Rule (CMS 2279-
P, 72 FR 28930) which prohibits federal matching funds for the cost of 
GME programs as part of Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient or 
outpatient services 
• The Outpatient Hospital Services Rule (CMS 2213-P, 72 FR 55158) 
which narrows the scope of Medicaid outpatient hospital services paid on 




Table 2.   Estimated Annual Loss of Federal Medicaid Funds to Level I Trauma 
Centers by City (in Millions)  
City Cost Limit 
Rule 
GME Rule Outpatient 
Hospital Rule 
Total Funding 
New York City 116 234 35 384 
Los Angeles 85 18 2 104 
Chicago 25-35 4 1 30-40 
Houston 70-81 4 0.2 74-85 
Denver 30-40 0.4 NS 30-40 
Total 
Nationwide 
326-357 260 38 623-654 
Perhaps even more telling were the comments offered by each of the hospitals. 
Denver Health stated, “The impact of these regulations, if implemented, will be to 
devastate the Colorado safety net system requiring Colorado’s safety net hospitals to 
substantially decrease care to the uninsured.” The Ben Taub Hospital in Houston 
remarked, “The hospital district will have to significantly reduce services to the 
uninsured and the indigent patients in Harris County in order to bring the cost of services 
provided in line with funds available.” And University of Southern California Medical 
Center in Los Angeles added, “The impact of these regulations will undoubtedly result in 
the reduced inpatient and outpatient services in Los Angeles County. Decreased access 
will result in further impacts to emergency rooms already overwhelmed by increasing 
patient volumes”(House Committee, 2008). 
One of the primary differences between the Spanish system and the U.S. is unlike 
Medicare, which is strictly a health insurance program; the Spanish Social Security 
System developed a highly centralized national health system of hospitals and clinics. 
Then through decentralized management, the Inter-Territorial Board has been able to 
provide coordinated and collaborative services to its population. In the U.S., hospitals, 
unless part of a corporate network, rarely work together to create and sustain regional 
preparedness. Furthermore, current financial issues as expressed in the Waxman paper 
restrict adequate hospital preparedness. Hospital preparedness is an additional “unfunded 
mandate.” As hospitals struggle financially to keep the doors open and maintain everyday 
 26
capacity, preparing for something that will more likely not occur is not a priority. 
Hospitals simply hope a disaster will not happen close to them, so they become the first 
hospital at which victims arrive.  
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IV. UNITED KINGDOM 
A. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION 
There can be no question that the histories of the United States and the United 
Kingdom are inextricably linked. An amalgam of cultures, the U.S. emerged from a 
violent revolution, a modified copy of the UK which had spawned it. Over the course of 
250 plus years, the countries have endured numerous wars, the death of colonialism, 
climactic shifts in world power and dramatic changes in population levels, distribution 
and makeup. Yet for all their differences, these two distant relations still look to each 
other for support in foreign policy matters. As Britain faces increased homegrown 
terrorism, the United States watches—relieved it is not occurring in its nation, but 
knowing intrinsically that the occurrence in the United Kingdom is a prognostication for 
the future of the U.S. The U.S. must look to the UK as a mentor; to learn lessons which 
will help it navigate through the coming storm of international and domestic terror. 
Today the UK and the U.S. share language, culture, governmental structure and 
democratic processes.  
In the 2001 census, the overall population of the UK, which is comprised of 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, was determined to be close to 59 million. 
By mid-2008, the population of the UK continued to grow to 60.9 million (Central 
Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2008). The majority (84 percent) of the UK’s populace is 
located in the densely populated country of England claiming 50.7 million people (as of 
2006) (Office for National Statistics, 2007). The UK is a parliamentary democracy with a 
constitutional Monarch as Head of State and bicameral legislature made up of the House 
of Lords and the House of Commons. Life expectancy is slightly higher in the UK than 
the U.S. and its infant mortality rate is slightly lower than the U.S. The overall U.S. life 
expectancy in 2005 was 77.8 years; female–80.4 years, male–75.2 years (Kung, Hoyert, 
Xu, & Murphy, 2008, p. 7). The U.S. infant mortality rate in 2005 was 6.87 deaths per 
1000 live births (Kung et al., 2008, p. 11). The overall UK life  
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expectancy in 2008 was 78.85 year; female—81.46 years, male—76.37 years. The UK 
infant mortality rate in 2008 was 4.93 deaths per 1000 live births (CIA, 2008). This is 
depicted in Table 3.  




Female Male Infant Mortality 
U.S.(2005) 77.8 80.4 75.2 6.87/1000 live births 
UK(2008) 78.85 81.46 76.37 4.93/1000 live births 
The United Kingdom has for a long time had legislation to protect the civilians 
and address emergency response starting in 1948 with the Civil Defence (sic) Act and the 
1950 Civil Defence Act of Northern Ireland. Most recently these acts were updated to 
recognize and accommodate the ever growing risk within UK society. Thus in 2004, The 
Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) replaced the Civilian Defence Acts and gave the British 
federal government expansive authorities concerning civil contingencies and serves as a 
framework for emergency response during disasters.  
The new CCA addresses threats to domestic services that the fore-mentioned acts 
previously did not. Civil contingencies include the protection of human life, health or 
safety and the treatment of human illnesses or injuries. The CCA is divided into three 
parts; Part One—Civil Protection, Part Two—Emergency Powers and Part Three—
Supplementary Legislation that support the Act. Part One defines the organizational roles 
and responsibilities. Part Two defines the temporary emergency powers and regulation 
that can be assumed by the Queen for a period of up to 21 days.  
The U.S. has always valued rugged individualism. As such, the U.S. did not have 
a comprehensive plan for federal emergency response until 1979 when through executive 
order the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created. Federal 
emergency response was further codified with the passage in 1988 of the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act expanded 
Federal emergency response giving statuary authority to FEMA.  
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Many similarities exist between the UK and the U.S. Just as the UK revamped 
their emergency response contingencies to meet the current threats, the U.S., following 
the devastation of September 11, 2001, passed the Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive -5 (HSPD-5) on February 28, 2003. The purpose of HSPD-5 is to enhance the 
ability of the U.S. to manage domestic incidents through standardized structures, policies 
and procedures. HSPD-5 promotes inter-operability among all response agencies through 
the use National Incident Management System (NIMS). Ongoing evolution led to the 
2005 National Response Plan (NRP) which defined how the federal government, in times 
of national incidence, would work in concert with state, local, and tribal governments and 
the private sector. The NRP was designed to be implemented also using NIMS. 
B. REPRESENTATIVE EVENT 
On July 7, 2005 at the height of rush hour three nearly simultaneous bombs 
exploded in the London underground transit system. Occurring at 8:50 am, the first attack 
occurred between the Aldgate and Liverpool Stations killing seven, followed 
subsequently within a minute by an attack at the Edgware platform killing six and a third 
attack occurring approximately two minutes later between the Russell Square and King’s 
Cross St. Pancras Stations resulting in an additional 26 dead. Within 50 seconds three 
terrorist attacks had claimed the lives of 49 innocent commuters, yet the attack was not 
over. One remaining terrorist had boarded a double-decker bus. At 9:47 am another 13 
lost their lives at Tavistock Square when he detonated himself. In total, 52 victims died at 
the hands of four extremist Islamic terrorists (for a total of 56 deceased) and 775 were 
injured, 20 of them critically injured; it was the biggest and deadliest attack ever 
perpetrated on the London transit system. 
In a retrospective analysis of the health care delivered, it was determined that 53 




Figure 2.   July 7, 2005, London Bombing Locations (From Wikipedia)  
Over triage is defined as victims who are triaged as critically injured when they 
are indeed not. The overall over-triage rate was calculated to be 64 percent. On further 
analysis of each individual site, the over-triage rates varied greatly from Edgware Road 
and Tavistock Square where over-triage rates were high and Aldgate and King’s 
Cross/Russell Square where over-triage rates were low. A predominate difference noted 
was in who completed the triaging at the scene. At both Edgeware Road and Tavistock 
Square the triage was completed predominately by ambulance service and medically 
trained bystanders. The over-triage rate was 88 percent and 77 percent respectively. 
Whereas at Aldgate and King’s Cross/Russell Square the triage was completed 
predominately by the Royal London’s Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (London-
HEMS) and the over-triage rates were significantly lower at 27 percent and 40 percent 
respectively (Aylwin et al., 2006, p. 2220). Conversely, the three deaths that resulted 
from the 20 critically injured occurred at the two sites with lower over-triage rate (one at 
Aldgate and two at King’s Cross/Russell Square). Table 4 examines at each of the four  
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sites with regard to the over-triage percentages, the raw number of critical mortality 
victims, the time for emergency personnel to clear the scene, and by whom the triage was 
completed.  
Table 4.   Site Specific Over-triage Percentages in Relation to Critical Mortality, 







Clear Scene Triage Completed by: 
Aldgate 27% n=1 64 mins London HEMS Staff 
Edgware 88% n=0 81 mins 






40% n=2 108 mins London HEMS Staff 
Tavistock 77% n=0 81 mins 





64% n=3 83.5 mins  
Immediate mortality associated with bombings is higher when it is either in a 
confined area or when there is structural collapse. Three of the four explosions in London 
were in confined spaces. The immediate mortality was seven percent (53/775) (Aylwin et 
al., 2006, p. 2223). The immediate mortality would have been greater had there been a 
structural collapse in the tunnels. Fortunately that was not the case, although being 
underground did hamper communications.  
Most time consuming was accessing and extricating the victims because three of 
the four explosions occurred underground. The time to clear the scenes took 64 minutes 
at Aldgate, 81 minutes at Edgeware, 108 minutes at King’s Cross/Russell Square and 81 
minutes Tavistock Square (Aylwin et al., 2006, p. 2224). The first responder arrived at 
Aldgate within nine minutes of the 999 call and the first ambulance within 11 minutes. 
Emergency services deployed to this site were decisive and rapid (Barnes, 2006, p. 25). 
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At Edgeware, communications appear to have slowed down the response. The 
first responder to arrive was on site 19 minutes after receiving the call (Barnes, 2006, p. 
30). At King’s Cross the response time was even slower due to severe communication 
problems that required physical runners to relay information. It is unclear when the first 
call was made, but the first responder arrived on scene at 9:14 am, approximately 21 
minutes after the explosion. The ambulance arrived at King’s Cross at 9:21 am, 
approximately 28 minutes after the explosion. The Fire Rescue Unit did not arrive, 
indicating the chaotic nature of the response and the severity of the communication 
failures. The explosion in this train occurred in the first carriage, which was closest to the 
Russell Square Station. No calls were received from Russell Square until 9:18 am, 25 
minutes after the explosion. By the time the first responder arrived at 9:30am, 37 minutes 
after the explosion, the conductor was leading the victims to the surface. The first 
ambulance did arrive until 45 minutes after the explosion at 9:38 am. This was the 
slowest of the response times (Barnes, 2006, pp. 33-34).  
The response at the Tavistock Square bus explosion was considerably faster. The 
first call was made within seconds of the attack at 9:47 am. Police just happened to be on 
site. It occurred just across the street from the British Medical Association building which 
contained physicians and other trained medical providers who were able to help. The first 
ambulance arrived 10 minutes later at 9:50 am (Barnes, 2006, p. 37). 






























Figure 3.   Time to Clear the Four Scenes (From Barnes, 2006, pp. 33-37)  
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Numerous contributing factors are being examined for the overall incident 
including; over-triage rates, time to clear the scene, level of experience of the triage 
personnel and the immediacy of access to trauma care. A fine balance exists between 
scene clearance and triage accuracy. With increased speed comes decreased triage 
accuracy and conversely, with decreased speed comes increased triage accuracy but 
delayed time to access trauma care. Although the events on July 7 were incredibly 
devastating, the sample size may not be large enough to make judgments about causality 
with a high level of confidence. However, associations and correlations have been 
explored. Figure 3 pictorially represents that with each underground bombing the time to 
clear the scene got increasingly longer from 64 minutes at Aldgate to 81 minutes at 
Edgware to 108 minutes at King’s Cross/Russell Square. The average time it took to clear 
all four scenes was 83.5 minutes. The first three attacks happened only minutes apart and 
this perhaps represents the mounting confusion, the break down in communication 
systems and the stretching of emergency resources. The bombing at Tavistock was nearly 
an hour after the first bombing, occurred above ground and serendipitously occurred in 
front of a building containing medical providers and police officers who were able to 
rapidly initiate the emergency response system. Ambulances that had been dispatched to 
Russell Square came across the explosion at Tavistock and inadvertently redirected 
themselves from Russell Square to Tavistock. No critical mortality deaths occurred at 
Tavistock. These multitudes of factors may have contributed beneficially to the critical 
mortality rate.  
Critical mortality deaths occurred at Aldgate (n=1) and King’s Cross/Russell 
Square (KC/RS) (n=2). Aldgate had the fastest scene clearance yet still had one critical 
mortality death. Yet, the documented over-triage rate at Aldgate was the lowest at 27 
percent. This is credited to the caliber of highly qualified trauma personnel responsible 
for the triage. Both Aldgate and King’s Crossing the triage was completed by the by 
Royal London’s Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (London-HEMS). Perhaps what 
is being detected at Aldgate was under-triage occurring; indicating that a critically injured 
person was not identified as such and was not assigned to immediate care. It is felt that a 
50 percent over-triage rate is optimal to eliminate under-triage rates and improve triage 
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accuracy and thus critical mortality rates (Fryberg & Tepas, 1988, p.569). The low over-
triage rates of 27 percent at Aldgate and 40 percent King’s Cross/Russell Square may 
have resulted in unintentional under-triage.  
The first hour after a traumatic event is referred to as “the golden hour”. Although 
there is no scientifically proven window of time, it is strongly believed in the medical 
community that the sooner a victim can get to definitive care the greater are his or her 
chances of survival. The response until all the victims were cleared at King’s 
Crossing/Russell Square was the longest of the disaster at 108 minutes -one point eight 
hours. This is significantly in excessive of the golden hour. It was unable to be 
determined in the literature review the percentage of the victims evacuated within the 
golden hour.  The excessive delay to clear the scene possibly negatively contributed to 
the critical mortality rate at King’s Crossing/Russell Square. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESSES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
The bombings on 7–7 had a lower critical mortality rate (15 percent) in relation to 
other terrorist mass casualty events. Using historical knowledge from other events, an 
over triage of 64 percent would be extrapolated to a critical mortality of 25-30 percent 
(Aylwin et al., 2006, p. 2224). Examining the low critical mortality rate of 15 percent 
(3/20 that were critically injured) despite the over-triage rate of 64 percent, several 
factors are believed to have contributed favorably. Credited are the rapid casualty access, 
assessment and evacuation by an effective pre-hospital trauma system (Aylwin et al., 
2006, p. 2223). London’s major incident plan requires medical doctors to be present at 
the scene of an incident to tactically manage the medical component of the response and 
this was accomplished at two of the four sites (Aldgate and King’s Cross/Russell Square). 
Incidentally, both Aldgate and King’s Crossing had a larger percentage of critically 
injured victims at these two sites (Aylwin et al., 2006, p. 2221). Having scene clearance 
done in an organized and efficient manner by trained and qualified medical personnel 
facilitates reduced triage errors. Although a total of three critically injured people died 
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from these two sites, it can be assumed that more would have died had it not been for the 
trauma personnel who had the experience to make the critical decisions at the site. 
Additionally, critically mortality is also reduced the more immediate the access to 
health care. The 675-bed Royal London Hospital primary trauma center was fortuitously 
located between the Aldgate and King’s Cross/Russell Square stations allowing for rapid 
transport to the facility. Being a leading UK primary trauma center, the hospital was 
specialized in the treatment of patients with acute and life threatening trauma injuries. 
Primary Trauma Centers require trauma surgeons to be on staff 24-hours a day thus 
trained and skilled trauma personnel were on-duty and ready to perform as this series of 
disasters unfolded. 
Also credited were the immediate operations done in the “damage control” mode 
to expand the immediate resources to as many casualties as possible. Surgeries were done 
only to stabilize the victims rather than to provide all needed definitive care. This allowed 
the trauma center to optimize its surge capacity and provide life-saving care as quickly to 
as many people as possible. Subsequent surgeries were scheduled to occur after all the 
expected casualties had arrived or they were sent to other facilities. Hospital surge was 
able to be maintained for the duration of the event.  
D. GENERALIZABLE PRACTICES 
The events that occurred on July 7 teach emergency trauma professionals that 
reducing critical mortality and improving survival requires ongoing, detailed examination 
of the trauma health care system and the continual triaging of the victims. Simply 
dumping a lot of capacity into the system will not reduce critical mortality. Optimized 
surge capacity requires the system to be able to flex and retract as it needs to. The entire 
system cannot and does not need to flex at the same time, but rather it needs to pulse as is 
needed. Systematic reassessment and reprioritization is necessary to optimize surge 
capacity and needs to occur continually throughout the system to allow resources to be 
allocated in the way most beneficial at the moment needed. For this to happen at the most 
efficient level, highly qualified trauma personnel must be involved in this process from  
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the initial scene and at every step in the process. Trauma personnel cannot be sequestered 
only in the operating rooms. They need to be forward in the field making the critical 
decisions in a timely fashion. 
Undoubtedly triage errors will occur. Simply because a victim is either over-
triaged or under-triaged initially does not mean that triage error needs to continue 
throughout the system. Having the most highly trained professionals reassessing patients 
continually allows for the victim to be reclassified; thus surge can be managed 
appropriately and resources optimized. Accurate triage is known to increase survival 
(Fryberg & Tepas, 1988, p. 569).  
Research indicates that excessive over-triage results in the loss of salvageable 
lives, and that a linear relationship exists between over-triage and critical mortality 
(Fryberg  & Tepas, 1988, pp. 573–577; Aylwin et al., 2006, p. 2221). One way to manage 
over-triage is to make certain the initial triaging is conducted by experienced trauma 
specialists at the disaster site and not at the hospital or by less experienced responders at 
the scene. Triage can then serve as an aggressive screening tool that allows only the 
critically injured transport to the hospitals. Less critically injured can be medically 
managed and continually evaluated away from the hospitals allowing the constrained 
resources to be used for those most in need. 
Optimizing casualty triage and reducing critical mortality is an art and requires an 
intricate understanding of the forces at play. Rapid scene clearance, although ideal for 
getting victims to care sooner, can increase under-triage. Under-triage is particularly 
important to eliminate since it is always life threatening to the victim. Inadvertently 
overlooking a victim in critical condition robs him of the immediate care he needs. Over-
triaging can reduce under-triage rates, but excessive over-triage rates are known to 
increase critical mortality rates. It is not until after a disaster is over when retrospective 
review of the medical process determines the over-triage rates. 
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V. ISRAEL 
A. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION 
Israel is a nation small in size and in population, its size most often compared to 
that of the State of Rhode Island. The country has had substantial population growth 
since the founding of the nation state in May 1948. With only 806,000 residents in 1948, 
the population of Israel in 2008 has grown to be 7.3 million people—75.5 percent Jewish, 
20.1 percent Arab Israelis, and 4.4 percent unregistered (Jewish Virtual Library, 2009). 
Due to the limited geography, Israel is densely populated at 315 people/square foot 
(Jewish Virtual Library, 2009). Ninety-two percent of Israelis dwell in urban centers in 
the largest cities including Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Rishon Lezion (Jewish Virtual 
Library, 2009).  
Israel is considered the homeland of the Jewish people. Nestled next to the 
Mediterranean Sea it is surrounded by groups on all sides listed on the U.S. State 
Department’s List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Israel is unfortunately no stranger 
to terrorism. Although there are many dissimilarities between the U.S. and Israel, a lot 
can be learned by examining closely Israel’s emergency medical system and the way it 
addresses the trauma that besieges it daily.  
Like the U.S., Israel has a democratic government. It is governed by a 
parliamentary system. The Knesset, or legislative branch, consists of 120 elected 
members who serve for four-year terms. The Knesset would be most similar to the U.S. 
Congress. The executive branch is headed by the elected Prime Minister. This position is 
also for a term of four years and would be most similar to the U.S. President. The third 
branch is the judicial branch and the court system. This, too, is similar to the U.S. 
Supreme Court and U.S. court system. A fourth position, not specifically seen in the U.S., 
is the titular position of President. The President is not a member of any of the three 




both that of the executor and to attend ceremonial events (Israel Science and Technology, 
2009). Local government in Israel is similar to that of the U.S. Through regional 
elections, mayors and city councils are elected to manage the cities.  
The discipline of emergency medicine (EM) in Israel has, from sheer necessity, 
grown from its environment. Prior to the early 1990s, EM in Israel was similar to what is 
found in the U.S. today. The emergency departments were sorely understaffed. Staff 
coverage was from a myriad of disciplines and 24 hour emergency coverage was limited. 
However, the first Gulf War in 1991 highlighted the gaping holes in Israel’s delivery of 
EM triggering a wholesale overhaul of the discipline of EM.  
In 1993, the National Trauma System was created. Six facilities were designated 
to become Level I Trauma Centers and an additional 12 were designated to become Level 
II Trauma Centers. It was decided by the Israel Association for Trauma Medicine that the 
emergency departments (ED) in these hospitals would be staffed exclusively by trauma 
surgeons. By 1994, EDs were being redesigned to handle mass casualty events and ED 
staff was being replaced by certified emergency physicians (Halpern, Waisman, & 
Steiner, 2004, p. 534). 
By 1999, the standards for EM were tightened. EM was recognized as a “super-
specialty” rather than a primary specialty, as it is in the U.S. and UK. To practice EM, 
physicians needed to be board certified in a selective sub-section of specialties then 
complete an additional two and a half-year residency in EM. Only 63 of the existing 
emergency physicians met the criteria and were entered into the new super-specialty. 
Today, Israel has seven training programs that produce a total of 16 graduates a year 
(Halpern et al., 2004, p. 534). The needs of Israel mandated that their EM physicians be 
both mature and clinically experienced. Today 27 hospitals in Israel provide emergency 
medicine services (Halpern et al., 2004, p. 534). 
Since 1950, the Magen David Adom’s (Red Shield of David) has been the 
national emergency pre-hospital medical service of Israel operating several levels of 
response vehicles. It has grown from its modest beginnings in 1930 as a group of 
volunteers in Tel-Aviv. Magen David is responsible for the nation’s blood supply, pre-
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hospital services, first aide, transportation of patients and transportation of medical teams. 
Magen David also can be activated as an auxiliary arm to the Israeli Defense Force 
during times of War. Magen David is staffed with both paid professionals (600 EMTs 
and 450 paramedics and a considerable volunteer force numbering over 10,000) (Ellis & 
Sorene, 2008, pp. 6–8). Physicians who work with Magen David primarily do so as an 
adjunct to another full-time position. Physicians are from acute hospital specialties, but 
they are not from the “super-specialty” of EM. 
B. REPRESENTATIVE EVENT 
In the slightly over 60 years of statehood, Israel has suffered numerous terrorist 
attacks. They have become such a common occurrence in this small country, its 
population lives at a level of vigilance which is uncommon in other democratic societies. 
With all the tragedy that has befallen this small country, Israel’s medical community has 
the unfortunate reality that makes it a world leader in trauma medicine. 
Obviously many individual incidents could be analyzed as a representative event, 
but with such a collection of occurrences, a retrospective analysis of numerous events 
provides for more robust statistics. A retrospective review of mass-causality events in 
Israel from October 1, 2000 to September 1, 2004 was conducted by Aschkenasy-Steuer 
et al. During this period, 93 mass-casualty events occurred in Israel of which 33 occurred 
in the city of Jerusalem. The study looked specifically at the events that occurred in 
Jerusalem and were handled by Hadassah Hebrew University Medical Center, the sole 
Level 1 Trauma Center in Jerusalem. The study reviewed 541 victims who presented to 
the emergency department of which 208 were admitted. Overall mortality was measured 
to be a low 8.5 percent (Aschkenasy-Steuer et al., 2005, 491).  
Triage accuracy is central in Israel’s low critical mortality rates. Rather than being 
held in reserve, trauma specialists (surgeons and anesthesiologists) are forward deployed 
to the trauma bays to initiate triage immediately upon arrival of a patient. Forward 




procedure in Israel and at Haddasah Medical Center. Additionally, command and control 
is established immediately and the position of commander is given to the most senior 
trauma personnel present. 
Additionally, the authors of this study credit Israel’s unidirectional flow 
philosophy. Victims flow is in one direction only. Once the victim leaves the emergency 
department, they are not brought back. This allows for more timely assessment of all the 
victims. Another unique feature of the Israeli emergency medical system is that they have 
instituted scoop and run .Cognizant of the dangers of secondary explosions and terrorist 
attempts to collaterally damage the emergency medical system, little if any triage is done 
at the scene. The victims are rapidly extricated from the field and brought to the trauma 
team.  
C. IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESSES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
The scope and role of the paramedic has grown substantially. In the U.S., 
paramedics start intravenous (I.V.) lines and initiate not only Basic Life Support (BLS), 
but also Advanced Life Support (ALS). The Israeli emergency medical system has 
elected to minimize pre-hospital medical interventions. Rather than have paramedics 
stabilize and provide care in the field, they employ scoop and run (S&R) techniques. The 
alternate philosophy, when the victim is stabilized in the field, is referred to as stay and 
play (S&P). Because definitive medical care and equipment are not available in the field, 
it is felt that pre-hospital interventions delay the time it takes the victim to reach 
definitive care thus resulting in diminished outcomes.  
The benefits of scoop and run need to be compared in relation to the transport 
time. Israel is unique in that its population is concentrated in very urban settings close to 
its hospitals. In 80 percent of the transports, the response time is within 10 minutes and in 
95 percent of the transports, the response time is within 15 minutes (Rivkind, 2008). This 
must then be compared to the length of time it takes to provide pre-hospital procedures 
and whether that time is well invested in improving the clinical outcome of the victim. 
The insertion of a peripheral I.V. line takes eight to 12 minutes depending on the 
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experience of the technician (Rivkind, 2008). If the victim is in need of damage control 
surgery to stop severe blood loss and the transport time is less than the time it takes to 
complete the pre-hospital intervention, then scoop and run techniques may be in the 
better interest of the patient, particularly if the administration of fluids cannot be made at 
the same rate in which blood is being lost and the victims is at risk for exsanguination.  
Scoop and run is favored over stay and play (S&P) when the injury is penetrating 
in nature. In a retrospective study of 180 trauma victims conducted at the Level I Trauma 
Center at Temple University, it was determined that pre-hospital procedures reduced 
survival rates in trauma victims with penetrating injuries (Seamon et al., 2007, p. 119). 
Penetrating injuries are also the type most often seen in civilian terrorist bombings as a 
result of secondary blast injuries caused primarily by flying shrapnel and tertiary blast 
injuries caused when the blast wind either throws the victim against a fixed surface or a 
solid object strikes the victim (Seamon, 2007, p. 119; Davis & Lee, 2004). The study 
demonstrated that each pre-hospital procedure prolonged transport time to definitive care 
and pre-hospital procedures being done by paramedics were not the most critical 
intervention that was needed for a hypovolemic victim who had suffered penetrating 
injuries. Scoop and run techniques run the risk of increasing over-triage rates since 
everyone is being brought to the trauma bay rather than being sorted at the scene. Israel 
addresses this by placing their trauma surgeons and anesthesiologists in the trauma bays.  
D. GENERALIZABLE PRACTICES 
Like Israel, the U.S. emergency medical system today generally uses scoop and 
run principles; moving a victim as soon as it is safe to do so. The current goal is to get a 
patient transported within 10 minutes. Much is written in the literature concerning the 
relative benefits of S&R verses S&P. Despite fervently written polemic articles from both 
sides, it is important to understand the instances and factors that make one approach 
better than the other. The U.S., UK and Israel use scoop and run whereas most of Europe, 




to use scoop and run and why does this system appear to work favorably for them 
considering the retrospective review by Aschkenasy-Steuer et al. measured overall 
mortality to be only 8.5 percent (Aschkenasy-Steuer et al., 2005, p. 491)?  
As with much in medicine, a sequential algorithm can help identify critical 
information to facilitate the decision process necessary to improve outcomes. 
Understanding the factors that improve survivability based on the injury types sustained 
and the environment the care is being rendered in can improve survivability. Each 
emergency medical system needs to make the determination based on their unique 
factors. Scoop and run is a favorable system when the response time to definitive care is 
fast. For that reason, scoop and run works well in an urban population where both 
population and hospitals are clustered. In a rural setting or in a situation where the time to 
get to definitive care is extended, pre-hospital stabilizing is required and this is done 
through stay and play. 
Likewise, the greater the percentage of penetrating injuries, the more favorable is 
scoop and run. When knife stabbings or gun shot injuries are prevalent, scoop and run 
will be favored. Communities, such as Israel, who respond routinely to the penetrating 
injuries associated with bombings will favor scoop and run. Communities that have fewer 
penetrating injuries will be more inclined to use stay and play, particularly if their 
ambulances are staffed with physicians and equipped with more advanced supplies. 
Additionally, the professional types that staff the ambulance can affect the 
decision. In the U.S., physicians are rarely seen providing care interventions in a pre-
hospital setting. Whereas in countries that use stay and play, such as Germany, physicians 
routinely respond pre-hospital.  Israel’s system is a hybrid. Magen David operates several 
levels of ambulance. The EMT-B (basic) is staffed with either two EMTs or one EMT 
and one volunteer and contain basic equipment and defibrillator. They are primarily used 
for patient transport. They contain no physicians. An intermediary intensive care 
ambulance is staffed with one paramedic and one EMT. The intermediary ambulance also 
contains no physician. The Mobile Intensive Care Unit (MICU) is the highest level 
ambulance. It does contain a physician along with one paramedic and one EMT who 
usually serves as the driver. The MICUs are equipped to care for more critical patients.  
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The following algorithm in Figure 4 delineates the factors that need to be 
considered in the pre-hospital environment when determining whether scoop and run or 
stay and play is the better process for the population being served.  
 
Figure 4.   Algorithm for Determining Pre-Hospital Procedures 
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Predominate differences between scoop and run and stay and play are detailed in 
Table 5 below. 
Table 5.   Predominate Differences between Scoop and Run and Stay and Play 
 Scoop and Run Stay and Play 
Countries Utilizing Israel, U.S., UK Germany, France 
Medical Lead Paramedic Physician 
Philosophy Transport to definitive care under 10 minutes Stabilize first, then transport 
More ideal Environment Urban Setting : population and hospitals are clustered 
Rural Setting: population and 
hospitals are spread apart 
Use of Ambulance For speedy transport Serves as “hospital on wheels” 
Israel has demonstrated a low overall mortality rate in the victims cared for during 
the Second Intifada at Haddasah University. The favorable outcomes for the victims are a 
result of numerous aggressive changes Israel has made since the early 1990s. In addition 
to using scoop and run techniques to expedite transport to definitive care, Israel has 
forwardly deployed its most experienced trauma surgeons to the emergency bays to 
improve triage accuracy and to maintain continuity of care. Understanding that a large 
majority of survivors are not critically injured and that the non-critically injured are 
usually the first to reach the hospital, Israel has developed a system that reduces over-
triage rates by having their most qualified complete the initial triage (Frykberg & Tepas, 
1988, p. 569).  
The specialty of emergency medicine has evolved out of necessity to be a super-
specialty, ensuring the maturity and years of experience necessary for a physician to 
perform in these critical situations. In addition to providing triage, an EM physician also 
serves as the incident commander maintaining detailed records and tracking the 




system in only one direction. Once they move through the ED, they are not returned to 
the ED. The capacity of the ED is reserved for additional victims who are being brought 
to the hospital. 
ED staff in Israel understands the epidemiological differences of terrorist 
bombings. They have extensive experiential clinical understanding of the major injury 
differences between a confined space explosion and an open spaced explosion, allowing 
them to be more clinically prepared when victims come through their doors. Israel has 
indentified that from the time of an attack, they have approximately 20 minutes before 
they receive victims. In those few minutes an assessment of the size and severity of the 
incident occurs. Based on the day of the week and the time of the day, and the location of 
the blast they can estimate roughly the number of victims to expect and the severity of 
their condition. Explosions in confined areas result in more severely injured victims. 
Additional staff is recalled to the hospital. Communications are established immediately 
with the emergency medical service for up to the moment casualty reports. By addressing 
all of these factors, Israel has improved its trauma care dramatically. 
Lessons learned in Israel should be examined for applicability in other health care 
systems as appropriate. The U.S. has had the luxury of having very few terrorist attacks 
on its soil. With that luxury comes inexperience in handling these situations. In addition, 
the rarity of the events can create complacency and an unfortunate expectation that what 
other nations are experiencing will not ever happen in the U.S. Israel’s trauma system 
evolved not so much because it wanted to but because it had to.  Israel’s maturation over 
the past 15 years is resulting in improved outcomes and saved lives after terrorist attacks. 
Although there are numerous differences between the U.S. and Israel, salient components 













THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 47
VI. U.S. MILITARY 
A. HISTORY  
Tactical field care during war has given the United States military ample 
opportunity to develop combat trauma guidelines that serve and protect the casualty / 
soldier to the greatest extent possible. Prior to the mid-1990s, military trauma care 
followed that of the civilian world. In 1996, understanding that the military faces 
environmental challenges that are very different from the civilian world, the Tactical 
Combat Casualty Care (TCCC or TC3) treatment guidelines for casualties in the battle 
field were developed by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOMM). These 
guidelines have been implemented in Special Operations Units and have been endorsed 
by the National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) and the 
American College of Surgeons and are being used in the most current wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. TCCC is considered to be both a medical and logistical model. The goal is 
to meet the best outcomes for the casualty and the mission. The premise for TCCC is that 
the care is tiered, constituting tactical actions carefully designed to yield the greatest 
decrease of preventable combat death. Casualty care must be critically executed and 
appropriately timed corresponding to the tier.  
Due to the nature of war, the provider has little if any knowledge of the victim, 
pre-existing health conditions or documentation of previous health care. The duty of the 
military medical provider is to the mission. Thus the triage paradigm is shifted. Rather 
than rendering care to the worst scenario first, triage is rank-ordered based on 
survivability. Priority is given to the soldier who has survivable injuries over the soldier 
that has non-salvageable injuries. Injuries that are considered to be non-salvageable 
include mortal wounds, 100 percent full-thickness burns, blunt traumatic cardiac arrest, 
cardiac arrest from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive events 
(CBRNE), trunk trans-section, head penetration that affects both hemispheres, blast lung 
and total body disruption (Davis & Lee, 2004). 
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B. REPRESENTATIVE EVENT 
According to statistics from the Department of Defense, the lethality of war has 
decreased significantly since the Revolutionary War. In 1783 following the 
Revolutionary War, the lethality of the war wounded was 42 percent. In the current war 
in Iraq, the lethality of the war wounded has dropped to 10 percent. Of course a lot has 
changed both in the waging of war and the practice of trauma medicine since 1783. 
However, this is a significant reduction and one that warrants examination, particularly 
the implementation of TCCC. 
During the first Iraq War in 1990–1991, TCCC guideline had not yet been put 
into practice. The lethality from the first Persian Gulf War in Iraq was 24 percent. TCCC 
guidelines were implemented in 1996 between the first Iraq War and the current war. The 
lethality of the current war has dropped significantly to 10 percent (as calculated in 2004) 
(Gawande, 2004, p. 2472). As shown in Figure 5, the lethality during the Korean War, 
Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War remained relatively constant, around 24 percent; 
therefore, a drop to 10 percent is a marked decrease. Even if one examines the linear 
trend of the percentage of lethal war wounds over sequential military actions, the current 
lethality is still far lower than the estimated trends.  TCCC guidelines have been credited 
in part to this significant improvement. 
Although other contributing factors may be influencing the decrease in lethality, 
the implementation of TCCC guidelines is viewed as an “overwhelming success” 
according to CPT Michael Tarpey, Battalion Surgeon for the 1/15th Infantry (Butler, 
2005, p. 3). The TCCC initiative is now being implemented in other medical units 
including the 82nd Airborne, the 10th Mountain, the Third Infantry, and the 101st Airborne 
Divisions (Butler, 2005, p. 3). 
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Figure 5.   Percentage of Lethality of War Wounded (From Gawande, 2004, p. 2472) 
C. TCCC DEFINITION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
TCCC is focused primarily and specifically on the epidemiology of combat 
injuries most often encountered in war. The military understands that 90 percent of 
combat deaths occur in action (KIA) on the battlefield. As such, it has identified the 
injury types not sustainable for life, allowing it to redirect efforts to provide the highest 
survivability for those soldiers that are not killed (Tarpey, 2005). The emphasis has been 
changed to address the most common battle field injuries.  
Important to highlight are the difference between conventional civilian emergency 
care and the treatment of battlefield casualties. The conventional civilian emergency 
standard of care rendered is to provide all care necessary to a single patient by multiple 
staff with specialty staff as back ups and unlimited resources. Conventional emergency 
room practices revolve around advanced life support (ALS). ALS follows the convention 
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known as A-B-C-D, where A stands for assess airway, B for breaths or ventilation, C for 
circulation or chest compressions and D for definitive care, defibrillation, and drugs. 
TCCC guidelines do not follow the ABCD algorithm of ALS. TCCC avoids teaching 
procedures such as Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and endotrachial intubation 
since they have not proven valuable in combat medicine. Reviving an individual 
following traumatic cardiac arrest has a bleak prognosis. CPR was developed for hearts in 
otherwise healthy people and even then the survival rate is lower than five percent (Stiell, 
2004, p. 647). Therefore A (airway) and the B (breathing) are not done in the field. The 
algorithm starts with C (circulation or hemodynamics). TCCC follows a C-B-A algorithm 
while conventional emergency room care follows the A-B-C-D paradigm. 
The overwhelming cause of preventable death remains hemorrhaging from 
extremity injuries. Understanding that rapid hemorrhaging leads to death, tourniquets are 
used until the casualty can be moved to emergent surgery and definitive care. TCCC 
focuses on training medics to stop hemorrhaging promptly. TCCC guidelines have 
proven to save lives by stopping hemorrhaging.  In an After Action Review (AAR) of the 
medics of the 75th Ranger Regiment, it was noted that at least seven Ranger’s lives had 
been saved through the use of tourniquets (Butler, 2005, p. 3). Furthermore, in a 
retrospective study conducted on the deaths of 84 Special Operations troops in the current 
war, it was determined that 12 (14.3 percent) of those deaths may have been preventable 
had the TCCC guidelines been adhered to more closely (Butler, 2005, p. 3). Once the 
lifesaving intervention is made, rapid evacuation of the casualty to a forward surgical 
team (FST) is imperative.  
Military surgery and TCCC aim for damage control. Damage control surgery is a 
major advance in trauma medicine, but it requires a paradigm shift from traditional 
surgery techniques and teachings that favor definitive surgery. TCCC understands that 
patients with massive exsanguinating injuries will not survive complex and extensive 
procedures. Therefore the surgery is staged using damage control procedures. Patients are 
moved through the battle theater care accordingly. The first step is to stop hemorrhaging 
and control contamination. This is done at the FST.  
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The FST is a new concept in the military medical operation; its genesis from 
lessons learned during Operation Desert Storm/ Persian Gulf War where lives were lost 
unnecessarily from blood loss. The FST was initially created in 1997 to move just behind 
the troops and provide the first level of trauma care. The FST concept was adopted and 
now more than 10 teams are operating in Iraq. Being mobile allows the casualty to be 
within 60 minutes of the FST.  The capabilities of the FST include supplies to conduct 
surgery, including anesthesia equipment, an intensive care pack and ventilators. The team 
is comprised of 20 people: three general surgeons, one orthopedic surgeon, three nurses, 
the remainder medics and ancillary personnel (Gawande, 2004, p. 2471).  
Surgery that occurs at the FST is not definitive but rather done using the damage 
control procedures. Surgeries are reduced to be less than two hours in length. Emphasis is 
simply to stop the hemorrhaging and to control contamination. From the FST, victims are 
med-evaced to the next level of care often with the wound open, still sedated, paralyzed 
and ventilated to the combat support hospital (CSH). 
CSHs are located further from the battlefield but still within the theatre of 
operation. The mission of the CSH is to provide medical care and hospitalization services 
in support of combat operations.  Here as well as at the FST, the care is not meant to be 
definitive. The maximum length of stay is meant to be no more than three days. Patients 
who require more than three days are transferred to a level IV hospital. These are located 
in Germany, Spain and Kuwait. If it is anticipated a soldier will require more than 30 
days of treatment, he or she is further med-evaced back to the United States where he or 
she is either treated at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C. or the 
Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas. Figure 6 demonstrates the rapid 
movement of the victim in concentric circles outward from the battlefield toward 
definitive care.  
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Figure 6.   Casualty Movement from the Battlefield through Centric Levels of Definitive 
Care 
Change is difficult for humans to make—particularly when a provider is trained 
and practices for years to provide the best definitive care possible. It is the antithesis of 
“good medicine” to complete only part of a procedure and put the patient on a helicopter 
for someone else to finish up the work. Initially, surgeons were reluctant to give up “their 
patients” and wanted to hold onto their patients to provide definitive care. However, the 
wisdom of the system has slowly transformed combat medical operations.  According to 
reports from Walter Reed Army Medical Center, at the beginning of the war in May 
2003, it took on-average an injured soldier eight days to be moved from the battle field to 
definitive care in the United States. By late 2004, the average time was reduced to less 








improvement (Gawande, 2004, p. 2473). As surgeons have embraced the principle of 
TCCC and damage control surgery, casualties are moving to the appropriate level of care 
where they can receive definitive care more quickly. Although it may be too soon to 
make a definitive  assertion, the fundamental changes implemented between the first 
Persian Gulf War and the current war appear to be strongly correlated to the reduction in 
lethality between the two wars.  
Challenges do exist with the implementation of TCCC. Physicians, medical staff 
and medics that routinely work in a civilian emergency room need to continually receive 
the latest training in the TCCC guidelines. It has been determined that the closer the 
medics/medical providers receive this training to when they are actually deployed to the 
field, the better they perform in the combat environment (Butler, 2005, pp. 1–6). 
Additionally, medics must be specifically trained to use the medical equipment and 
implement medical procedures most common to combat trauma. These include, but are 
not limited to, tourniquets, application of hemostatic agents and hypotensive 
resuscitation.   
D. GENERALIZABLE PRACTICES 
During a civilian mass casualty event, particularly involving explosives, it is 
imperative to accept and recognize that the medical environment will be more similar to 
the battle field than to a routine day in the emergency room. Rather than predominately 
blunt traumas, injuries will be more in-line with those seen on the battlefield. In the case 
of a bombing, the characteristics of the bomb significantly change the anticipated impact. 
The types and frequencies of injuries are categorized into four major categories. These 
include Primary, Secondary, Tertiary, and Quaternary Blast Injury (Arnold, 2003, p. 






Table 6.   Characteristics of Blast Injuries  
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Epidemiological outcomes vary greatly with the characteristics of the event. This 
is specifically why civilian medical providers need to understand the differences and be 
trained to deliver medical care accordingly. Jeffrey Arnold, Medical Director of the Yale 
New Haven Center for Emergency and Terrorism Preparedness, stresses  “it is prudent to 
‘expect the unexpected,’ (but) an understanding of the epidemiological patterns in mass-
casualty, terrorist bombings provides a rational basis for emergency planning, 
preparedness, and response” (Arnold, 2003, p. 221). Explosions are the most common 
case of causalities associated with terrorism (Arnold, 2003, p. 221). There have been very 
prominent bombings in the United States such as September 11, the Murrah building in 
Oklahoma City and the 1996 Atlanta Olympics that have been brought to the forefront of 
all Americans’ minds. The 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City along with the 1996 Olympic bombing established very prominently that 
homegrown terrorism is a very valid issue in this country. Still, the civilian health care 
system views bombings as a relatively infrequent event. In actuality, bombings are far 
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more pervasive in this country than the few mentioned above. Between 1988 and 1997, 
there were 17,579 bombings in the United States, averaging five per day (Davis & Lee, 
2004). As insidious acts of terrorism increase and become more frequent within U.S. 
borders, civilian medical providers must train to adjust medical care delivery accordingly 
to the specific situation just like their colleagues in the military Special Operations 
community.  
As terrorists have become more sophisticated, extensive coordination allows 
numerous cities or sites to be targeted simultaneously, as was the case on September 11. 
When numerous cities are involved, the effect is dramatically augmented as numerous 
health systems are overwhelmed concurrently. Depending on the characteristics of the 
bombing, the local emergency medical resources can be easily overwhelmed. In the first 
24 hours after the September 11 plane crashes in New York City, over 500 victims 
presented for emergency care at a hospital four blocks from ground zero, while another 
300 sought care at the next hospital over which was within one mile (Pesola, 2002, p. 
220). It is prudent that the lessons of military tactical combat care be studied. 
What can be learned from military tactical combat care and can these tactics be 
applicable and beneficial in the civilian medical environment during a mass casualty 
event? The dramatically reduced lethality to war was accomplished by understanding the 
most common battlefield injuries and modifying trauma medicine to address trauma in a 
battlefield environment. Triage is based on survivability rather than treating the worst 
injured first. The traditional ALS paradigm of A-B-C-D has been strategically rearranged 
based on outcomes to be C-B-A. Medical care has been restructured to flexible and 
mobile. The FSTs are just behind the troops within the golden hour. Surgery and care is 
then done using damage control procedures. Ownership of the patient by the surgeon is 
given up in exchange for rapid transport of the soldier to definitive care at the CHS or in 
the Unites States. All these components together are referred to as TCCC and are strongly 
felt to be a significant contributing factor the reduction in war lethality. 
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VII. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE DATA 
The analysis of mass casualty events in the trauma health care systems of the UK, 
Spain, Israel and the U.S. military allows for similarities and differences among the 
systems to be identified and correlations to be drawn as it relates to critical mortality. 
Obviously there are differences among each of the trauma systems in this paper, and 
these each differ from the civilian system in U.S.  Regardless of the differences, 
numerous similar prominent findings were identified as positively influencing critical 
mortality. These fundamental findings include: triage accuracy, definitive care and 
damage control procedures. Triage accuracy is the correct and timely sorting and 
prioritization of victims that manages over-triage rates and eliminates under-triage rates. 
Definitive care is defined as the completion of all recommended or necessary care 
including the diagnosis, treatments and administration of drugs. A definitive care site is a 
medical facility that is able to provide this comprehensive level of care. Damage control 
procedures are when surgeries are incremental and are done to stabilize a victim until he 
or she can receive definitive care. 
It is important to identify that critical mortality was low in all of the case studies 
delineated in this analysis despite the over triage rates being greater than the optimal 50 
percent for the Spain and UK events. See Table 7.  
Table 7.   Critical Mortality of the Cases Studied 
 Critical Mortality 
 
Spain -11Mar04 17.2% (5/29)  OT = 68% 
UK—07Jul05 15% (3/20)    OT= 63% 
Israel 8.5% 
U.S. Military Reduced from 24% to 10% with the implementation of TCCC. 
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Examining the critical mortality rates listed above and comparing them to the 
graphic relation in Frykberg’s article, each of these case studies demonstrates a reduction 
in critical mortality from other prominent terrorist attacks studied by Frykberg. As is 
depicted in Figure 7, Spain’s event, with a critical mortality of 17.2 percent and the UK’s 
event with a critical mortality of 15 percent were both beneath the line; indicating critical 
mortality in these two events was lower than would have been expected.  Therefore, the 
countries must have been able to do something better and their approaches merit to be 
adapted and adopted. 































Figure 7.   Linear Relation of Over-triage Rate to Critical Mortality (From Frykberg, 
2002, p. 207) 
Frykberg analyzed 10 terrorist bombings between 1968 and 1995. The linear 
correlation coefficient equals 0.92. Frykberg conducted his research prior to the events in 
Spain and the UK. Those points have been overlaid on this graph. 
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According to the graph calculated by Frykberg, the July 7, 2005 UK event, with 
an over-triage rate of 63 percent, would have been predicted to have a 23.5 percent 
critical mortality rate versus 15 percent (which extrapolates to four point seven deaths 
versus three deaths) and the March 11, 2004 Spain event, with an over-triage rate of 68 
percent, a 26 percent critical mortality rate versus 17.2 percent (which extrapolates to 
seven point five deaths versus five deaths). This reduction in critical mortality translates 
into theoretical lives saved; one point seven lives in UK and two point five lives in Spain. 
See Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.   Reduction of Critical Mortality (After Frykberg, 2005) 
Based on the research done by Frykberg, this graphic demonstrates the lives 
saved, through decreased critical mortality, from what would have been predicted. The 
colored areas under the line represent the lives that were salvaged. 
The literature did not specify the over triage rates in the U.S. military or in the 
Israel study. Yet Figure 9 represents substantial decrease in critical mortality from prior 
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to the implementation of TCCC (24 percent) to after the implementation of TCCC (10 
percent). The implementation of TCCC reduced critical mortality to nearly that of Israel, 
















Figure 9.   Reduction of Critical Mortality with the Implementation of TCCC 
As discussed earlier, triage accuracy is the management of over-triage and the 
elimination of under-triage through effective rapid and repetitive triage. To optimize 
triage accuracy one must understand the conflict between rapid scene clearance and over-
triage. The more rapidly a scene is cleared the greater will be the over-triage rate. Yet 
moving victims to definitive care within the golden hour positively influences critical 
mortality rates. Triage done by trained trauma staff improves triage accuracy. 
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In these case studies, the UK, Israel and the U.S. military have all addressed triage 
accuracy, each in a way that fits the characteristics of their environment and emergency 
system. The UK forward deploys trained emergency HEMS physicians to the site. This 
was cited as a predominate reason a low critical mortality rate of 15 percent occurred at 
the July 7 bombings. 
Although Israel does not have physicians on all its ambulances, it does have 
physicians on its highest level MICU ambulance. In the very confined country of Israel 
where the population is centered near the major medical centers, Israel has opted for 
scoop and run to facilitate the expeditious movement of victims. One drawback is that the 
physicians on the MICU are not trauma physicians. To manage over-triage, they have 
their most skilled trauma providers in the trauma bays of the hospital conducting initial 
sorting and triage of the victims.  
The U.S. military, through TCCC, has addressed triage accuracy by understanding 
the epidemiology of combat injuries and adjusting their practice to increasing 
survivability. Rather than continue practicing medicine based on the standards practiced 
in civilian medicine and provide all care necessary to the most injured victim, they have 
learned what is survivable and pour their resources into that population so as to salvage 
the most lives possible. Table 8 below details the interventions that each system has 
implemented that has improved triage accuracy. 
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Table 8.   Triage Accuracy 




Over-triage rate was determined to be 68% yet critical mortality was 
lower than what would have been expected. Triage was completed by 
the most experienced trauma specialists. Casualty distribution was 





Forward deployment of London HEMS Staff. 
Scene clearance completed by qualified medical personnel. 
Continuous triaging and re-triaging to improve accuracy. 
 
Israel 
Forward deployment of trauma specialist at the trauma bay and 
MICU. 
Specialty of EM transitioned to a super-specialty. 
Modified trauma medicine to address gaps from the first Persian Gulf 
War and based on the epidemiology of blast injuries from terrorist 
attacks. 
U.S. Military Modified combat medicine specifically based on the epidemiology of combat injuries rather than civilian injuries. 
The second predominant finding identified in the reduction of critical mortality is 
definitive care. These findings are outlined in Table 9 below. Again the UK, Israel, and 
the U.S. military have all addressed definitive care in their own systems. Rescuers are 
trained to get the victim and themselves out of the impacted scene as quickly as possible 
and get the victim to definitive trauma care without delay. 
Because definitive medical care and equipment is not available in the field, the 
UK and Israel feel that pre-hospital interventions delay the time it takes the victim to 
reach definitive care, thus resulting in diminished outcomes. With their populations in 
urban centers near the hospital, the UK and Israel both employ scoop and run techniques. 
It is felt that pre-hospital procedure prolong transport time to definitive care and pre-
hospital procedures being done by paramedics are not the most critical intervention that 
are needed for trauma victims suffering penetrating injuries. Scoop and run is a favorable 
system when the response time to definitive care is fast. 
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The U.S. military physician has learned to give up “ownership” of his or her 
patient. He or she relies on the network and system set up by the military to move the 
victim through the levels of care as needed. In understanding that they cannot provide 
definitive care in the field or even at the FST, surgery at the FST is done through damage 
control procedures. By not holding on to their patients, military doctors are able to 
perform damage control surgery urgently and then move them to the appropriate level of 
definitive care immediately there after. As is demonstrated by the practices of the 
military, damage control surgery and rapid movement to definitive care are inextricably 
linked and together they maintain capacity for future casualties. 
Although Spain had the highest over-triage rate of the four cases examined at 68 
percent, it still had a low critical mortality rate of 17.2 percent. In this case, it was 
determined that the nearest hospital lacked neither staff nor capacity. This is credited to 
its highly centralized national health system of hospitals and clinics. Through 
decentralized management Spain has been able to provide coordinated and collaborative 
services to its population, as well as to create and sustain regional preparedness. By 
having this level of regional preparedness, the health system resources were not actually 






















Hospital and staffing capacity was immediately available at the 




Scoop and Run. 
Israel 
Scoop and Run favorable in small nation. 
EM physician serves as Incident Commander. 
Uni-directional patient movement. 
U.S. Military 
Relinquishing “ownership” of soldier allows for more rapid 
movement to definitive care. Rapid evacuation to the FST. Uni-
directional patient movement. FST within range to be within the 
golden hour. Time to move soldier from battle field to definitive care 
reduced by half (8 days to 4 days). 
The third predominant finding identified in the reduction of critical mortality is 
the implementation of damage control procedures. In these case studies, initial operations 
were done in the “damage control” mode to expand the immediate resources to as many 
casualties as possible. Surgeries were done only to stabilize the victims rather than to 
provide all needed definitive care. This allowed the trauma center to optimize its surge 
capacity and provide life-saving care as quickly to as many people as possible. 
Subsequent surgeries were scheduled to occur after all the expected casualties had arrived 
or they were sent to other facilities. Hospital surge is able to be maintained for the 
duration of the event.  
Damage control surgery, which has evolved over the past 20 years, is a most 
important advancement in trauma medicines. Like any change, it has been slow to catch 
on. Surgeons are accustomed to providing definitive procedures immediately. Yet 
research is indicating that outcomes are improved when the surgeries are shortened and 
incremental in nature. Recognizing that victims of trauma are more likely to die from 
metabolic failure, shortening the procedures allows for trauma victims to have their 
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metabolic imbalances corrected (Brohi, 2002). Table 10 below details the interventions 
that each system has implemented in the area of damage control. It is important to 
reiterate that damage control surgery and rapid movement to definitive care are closely 
related and augment one another while maintaining capacity in the system. 
Table 10.   Damage Control 








Immediate operations done only to stabilize the victim. 
Israel Scoop and run practice gets victim to trauma surgeons more quickly 
to perform damage control procedures. 
U.S. Military 
Triage based on survivability. 
Paradigm strategically rearranged C-B-A vs A-B-C–D. 
First step is to stop hemorrhaging and control contamination. 
“Ownership” of the soldier relinquished allowing surgery and care 
to be done with damage control procedures. 
Fusing the analysis of these case studies allows tangible recommendations to be 
made to the U.S. health and medical communities on how best to adopt and implement 
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Preparing for a mass-casualty event has captured the attention of policy makers, 
medical providers, accreditation bodies and the private sector. If current world events are 
any indication, the need to prepare for a terrorist-driven MCE has never been greater. 
Despite the experience of September 11, 2001, the U.S. trauma system lacks extensive 
experience with MCEs. Even though the hospitals in New York City surged to care for 
the expected victims of the twin towers, victims were either killed instantaneously or did 
not escape prior to the collapse of the structure. Medical staff ended up treating the 
walking wounded. Sadly, the U.S. trauma system remains woefully under-prepared. In 
order to expand and maintain surge capacity to handle a MCE in the U.S., efforts need to 
look beyond the tactical aspects and expand toward strategic changes that can be 
implemented at the national and regional levels rather than just at the individual hospital 
level. Preparing for a MCE requires the commitment of the federal government as well as 
the state and local health care systems.  
A well-understood fact is that the nearest hospitals are quickly inundated. Ideally, 
the first level of trauma care should be initiated within the golden hour, utilizing scoop 
and run practices when most appropriate. These closest hospitals must serve as a casualty 
collection point—initiating triage and damage control interventions. Surgery should be 
staged and incremental preserving capacity for future incoming wounded. Patients should 
be distributed outward from the epicenter of the event to other predetermined facilities as 
centers for definitive care.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on evaluation of theses four case studies, the U.S. civilian trauma care 





1. Maintain and augment capacity 
A. Regional coordination  
B. Funding 
2. Improved response procedure 
A. Triage accuracy 
B. Damage control procedures 
C. Rapid movement to definitive care 
B. IMPLEMENTATION  
By definition, an MCE is an event that overwhelms local capacity over a defined 
period of time. Improving outcomes for trauma victims is predicated on the ability of 
local providers to access regional resources. Paramount is coordinated regional planning 
which will improve casualty distribution and outcomes. This planning needs to be 
regionalized so hospitals and health systems, which in the current system do not have a 
broad regional perspective, work together to create a cohesive system rather than 
independently to create fragmented or worse, competing systems.  
The small geographic size of Israel makes it very unique and contributes 
substantially to the factors that contribute favorably to reduced critical mortality rates. 
Although the U.S. is exponentially larger than Israel, it is comprised of numerous cities. 
With regional preparedness and planning each of these cities could begin to realize the 
same benefits as seen in Israel. Urban centers must prepare regionally across 
jurisdictional boundaries to improve casualty distribution and expedite transport to 
definitive care. The benefits of this approach could be seen in Spain, where much of its 
success during the attacks on the transit system is attributed to the regionally coordinated 
and collaborative services provided to its population.  
There must be recognition that emergency health care preparedness is as critical 
to the overall response system as is law enforcement, fire or ambulance services. Because 
the health system in the U.S. is predicated on private enterprise and free market 
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capitalism, it is impossible to expect local hospitals and health care systems to 
individually fund the cost of adequately preparing for the risks that are seen as being very 
unlikely to happen in any one place. Funding which has been provided to hospitals since 
late 2006 through the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) has incrementally improved 
individual hospital preparedness but has done little to build necessary regional coalitions 
for effective response during a MCE. Combined with the changes to Medicaid, the thin 
margin that hospitals must operate within is eroding. The Department of Health and 
Human Services needs to direct more funds to hospitals and health care systems 
specifically for creating and sustaining surge capacity. Local hospitals are the frontline 
providers when disasters occur. They need to provide, maintain and augment capacity 
and cannot expect external assistance in the first critical hours. Expecting the federal 
government to arrive instantaneously and relieve the local hospital or jurisdiction is a 
flawed assumption on numerous levels, as it proved to be in 2005 during Hurricane 
Katrina. 
In non-crisis periods, most hospitals operate as definitive care sites. During MCE, 
facilities closest to the epicenter of a disaster must be able to transition to damage control 
procedures and be willing to move victims to other facilities radiating out from the 
epicenter. Broad regional pre-planning and coordination is critical for this dynamic 
switching to be effective. Furthermore, steps must be taken in the legislative arena which 
would protect facilities from litigation, promote collegial relationships and end the 
culture of patient “ownership” during MCEs. Only when hospital administrators are 
confident that they have effectively managed their own facility’s risk will they be willing 
to relinquish their individual positions and fold into the broader regional capacity.  
Once there is an effective regionally coordinated plan for the distribution of 
victims, hospitals can focus on the real issue: improved outcomes. This objective can be 
reached through the enhancement of triage accuracy, management of damage control and 
implementation of definitive care. The U.S. military trains over 1,200 physicians a year 
in the principles of TCCC and over 7000 since September 2001 (Davis & Hadley, 2007). 
Returning medical providers, utilizing the principles of TCCC have demonstrated the 
value of the system for achieving improvements in decreasing critical mortality rates. 
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Their knowledge must be integrated into standards of care during MCE. These physicians 
and medics have gained valuable clinical knowledge and practice which must be 
capitalized upon for implementation within the civilian sector.  
TCCC guidelines have not been used in the civilians sector as of yet. Although 
there are marked demographic differences between military combatants and civilian 
victims which are illustrated in Table 11, there is similarity in the epidemiology of the 
injuries and as such, battlefield medicine may serve an important role in preparing our 
civilian medical settings for terrorist MCEs. Of the medical staff returning from the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, 50 percent are Reservists and Guards and another 20 percent 
have left the military to be civilians.(Davis & Hadley, 2007) Never have more U.S. 
providers had more MCE trauma experience than the present. Just as the U.S. military 
has changed its triage practices to focus on ‘survivability’ on the battle field, so must the 
civilian sector change their practices. Any MCE planning and preparedness strategy must 
include improving triage accuracy to include managing over-triage rates to be near 50 
percent and eliminating under-triage rates to zero percent has been demonstrated to 
















Table 11.   Combatant versus Civilian (From Davis and Hadley, 2007) 
 Military Combatant Civilian Victim 
Demographic of Injured Mostly male, healthy, athletic, 18-35 years of age 
More young, more older, 




Helmet, armored vest, 
armored vehicles No PPE or armor 
Agent (Weapon Type) Manufactured high-order (HE) military ordnance 
Both makeshift low and 
high-order bombs 
Injury Patterns Well-studied. High tech shrapnel 
Poorly studied. 
Nails, bolts, glass 
Access to Care 
Organized trauma care, 
long-term rehabilitation, 
and life long assistance. 
Advocate is in the 
President’s cabinet. 
Variable access to care, 
rehabilitation, or assistance. 
Advocacy is ad hoc. 
 
The U.S. medical community must not assume that the rarity of terrorist events 
means planning is for naught. It behooves our medical community to learn from those 
who are facing terrorist attacks as a matter of course. Israel was forced, out of necessity, 
to change its trauma practices. They elevated trauma medicine to a super-specialty and 
have forwardly deployed this most qualified staff to the significant task of triage. Today 
Israel leads the world in the practice of trauma medicine and has the lowest critical 
mortality rates of the cases examined. The U.S. military has dramatically reduced its 
critical mortality rates between the last the two wars. Its rate is commensurate with 
Israel’s. Strengths of the military model must continue to be examined for applicability in 
the civilian medical setting during MCEs. 
It is imperative that medical professionals shape the strategy and define the 
procedures for a MCE, lest they be defined for them by the scope of the event or by the 
subsequent litigation. Efforts such as those undertaken by participants of the Task Force 
from the Mass Critical Care Summit must be applauded. By initiating the discourse, they 
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took ownership of a very sensitive and ethical dilemma facing the U.S. medical 
community. Having published the meeting, they take the first critical steps in the 
development of a comprehensive strategy to address care during a MCE. This summit 
must not be looked at as an end unto itself. It must be looked to as the beginning to an 
ongoing series of discussions that happen at a major, national scale.   
The U.S. medical community must appreciate that a change in the standard of 
care during a MCE does not reduce overall care rendered. As demonstrated through the 
cases studied in this research, critical mortality was reduced due to improved triage 
accuracy, rapid movement to definitive care, implementation of damage control 
procedures and coordinated and collaborative regional preparedness. A comprehensive 
strategic assessment allows the paradigm of mass trauma health care delivery to focus on 
reducing critical mortality.  
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